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1. Company rate and tax base
In 1986, the corporate tax rate was reduced from 46 per cent to 34 per cent (35
per cent since 1993 ), but the rate reduction was more than offset by base broadening provisions (e.g. repeal of the investment tax credit and lengthening the
depreciation schedules). Neither the rate nor the base has changed much since
then. State corporate taxes vary from state to state but can increase the rate by
over 5 per cent (taking into account the deductibility of state taxes). However,
the effective rate paid by many corporations is closer to 20 per cent, due primarily to a variety of tax planning techniques.
The top individual rate, which was only 28 per cent in 1986, has been
increased to 38.6 per cent (scheduled to go down to 35 per cent by 2006). Longterm capital gains of individuals are generally taxed at a rate of 20 per cent.

2. Nature of the company/shareholder tax system
The US tax system is classical, i.e. corporate income is taxed to the corporation
at the corporate rate, and dividends are taxed to shareholders at their rate. This
can be illustrated by the following example for an individual shareholder at the
top bracket (ignoring state taxes):
Company
Company income
Company tax (35%)
After-tax company income
Shareholder
Dividend
Individual's income
Individual's tax (38.6%)

100
35
65
65
65

25
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UNITED STATES
Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax

60

40

For corporate shareholders, this result is mitigated by a dividends received deduction ranging from 70 per cent to 100 per cent of dividends received. In addition,
there are many tax-exempt shareholders, such as universities and pension funds.
The classical system is mitigated somewhat by the preferential rate for capital
gains of individuals (20 per cent), which generally applies to corporate shares
held over one year. The effect of the capital gains preference can be illustrated by
the following example, in which a first shareholder invests 10 in the shares of a
company and then sells them before a dividend is paid. Note that capital losses
cannot generally be used to offset dividend income: 1
Company
Company income
Company tax (35%)
After-tax company income
First shareholder
Cost of shares
Sale price of shares
Individual's income (capital gain)
Individual's tax (20%)
Second shareholder
Dividend
Total income from dividend
Cost of shares
Sale price of shares
Loss on sale of shares
Net shareholder tax (38.6%)
Result for first shareholder
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Result for second shareholder
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax

100
35
65
10

75
65
13
65
65

75
10

(65)

25
48

52
25
(25) 2

Thus, the first shareholder is significantly better off than if he had received a dividend, while the second shareholder is worse off. 3 This represents an incentive for
This and the following example assume that capital gains reflect retained earnings. Of course,
capital gains may also reflect other factors such as good will, discovery of natural resources,
decline in inflation or appreciation in the currency, speculative bubbles, etc. If a company has no
retained earnings and profits, a distribution may be treated more favorably (as a return of capital) than realized capital gains.
Representing 40 in cash from the dividend, minus 65 in capital loss carryover (to be used
against future capital gains).
Assuming that the dividend tax is not capitalized into the price of the shares.
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retentions, and indeed US corporations pay few dividends (preferring to redeem
shares, which can often qualify for the capital gains rate). However, in the past
they paid more dividends under the same system, suggesting other factors may
play a role. The above results also create an incentive to sell shares to tax exempt
or corporate shareholders, who are not taxed fully on the dividend.
Note that the above results only apply if the first shareholder has held the
shares for over a year. If not, he would be taxed on the capital gain at the full 38.6
per cent rate, so that the result for him would be the same as if he had received a
dividend:
Company
Company income
Company tax (35%)
After tax company income
First shareholder
Cost of shares
Sale price of shares
Individual's income (capital gain)
Individual's tax (38.6%)

100
35

65
10

75

65
25

Second shareholder
Dividend
Total income from dividend
Cost of shares
Sale price of shares
Loss on sale of shares
Net shareholder tax (38.6%)

(65)
25

Result for first shareholder
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax

60
40

Result for second shareholder
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax

25
(25) 4

65
65
75
10

There are some rules designed to prevent unnecessary retentions (the accumulated earnings tax), although they are not very effective since they depend on a
showing that the corporation does not need the earnings for a valid business purpose. In addition, the personal holding company rules tax corporations that are
closely held and have primarily passive income at the top individual rate, but the
rate difference is small (and scheduled to disappear by 2006).

Representing 40 in cash from the dividend, minus 65 in capital loss carryover (to be used against
future capital gains).
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3. International taxation and company/shareholder
taxation
3.1. Dividends - US as the source country

When a US resident corporation (defined for US tax purposes as any corporation
incorporated in the US) pays a dividend to a non-resident shareholder, the dividend is generally subject to a 30 per cent withholding tax. US tax treaties typically reduce the rate to 5 per cent in the case of direct investors and 15 per cent in
the case of portfolio investors, although the recently signed US-UK tax treaty
has a O per cent rate for direct investors (defined as holding over 25 per cent in
most cases).
If a foreign corporation (defined as any corporation incorporated outside the
US) pays a dividend from US source earnings to foreign shareholders, the dividend may in some cases be subject to tax. However, this tax is rarely collected
and the US routinely waives its right to collect it under tax treaties. On the other
hand, US branches (permanent establishments) of foreign corporations are subject to a branch profits tax of 30 per cent (5 per cent under treaties) on the "dividend equivalent amount", which is the amount of taxable profits withdrawn from
the US in any given tax year. The right to collect the branch profits tax has by
now been incorporated into most US tax treaties. The branch profits tax, when it
applies, serves as an effective substitute for taxation of US source dividends paid
by foreign corporations to foreign shareholders.
The results of these rules is that in most cases the US collects two levels of tax
on inbound investment, whether in the form of a subsidiary or in the form of a
branch. This replicates the tax treatment of domestic investors, although treaty
rate reductions may result in a significantly lower total rate being levied on foreign investors.
3.2. Dividends - US as the residence country

Portfolio dividends received by US shareholders from foreign corporations are
fully taxed. A foreign tax credit is available, subject to limitations, for any withholding taxes levied on the dividend by the source country (but not for taxes paid
by the distributing foreign corporation).
Direct investments received by US corporate shareholders owning at least 10
per cent by vote of the shares are taxable (and no dividends received deduction is
available, unlike a corporate investment in a domestic corporation). However, the
foreign tax credit is available, subject to limitations, for any foreign withholding
tax and also for any foreign tax paid by the distributing corporation. The foreign
tax credit typically eliminates any residual US taxation of foreign source direct
dividends.
Thus, portfolio foreign source dividends are subject to tax in the same way as
dividends from domestic corporations. Direct foreign source dividends are typically not subject to US tax, like direct domestic source dividends.
940
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A few US treaties have in the past sought to obtain for US investors the benefits of imputation tax credits (e.g. the old US-UK treaty), but these are unusual
and are being phased out.
3.3. Capital gains - US as the source country

In general, the US does not tax capital gains of foreign portfolio or direct
investors in US corporations. The exception is US corporations more than 50 per
cent of whose value is US real estate. Nor does the US tax capital gains of shareholders from shares in foreign corporations that derive profits from the US. This
treatment contrasts with the treatment of domestic investors in US companies,
who are generally taxable on their capital gains (albeit at a preferential rate).
3.4. Capital gains - US as the residence country

Retained earnings of foreign corporations are subject to US taxation under an
elaborate set of "anti-deferral" rules, which apply to passive income. Direct
investors holding 10 per cent or more by vote of a CFC are subject to tax on
deemed dividends on the CFC's "Subpart F income" (generally, passive income
plus certain types of low-taxed active income). Portfolio investors holding shares
in a PFIC (a foreign corporation with over 75 per cent passive income or over 50
per cent passive assets) are taxed either currently on the PFIC's income, or with
an interest charge on distributions or sales, or on a mark to market basis.
Capital gains of US resident investors in foreign corporations are taxed on the
same basis as gains from the sale of shares in domestic corporations (i.e. at the
preferential 20 per cent rate for long-term individual investors), with a foreign tax
credit available only if the gain is considered foreign source (which would rarely
be the case, unless a treaty governs). US tax treaties generally seek to eliminate
source-based taxation of capital gains. There is no distinction between direct and
portfolio investment. Generally, therefore, double taxation applies to capital gains
if the foreign corporation was taxed at source, mitigated by the preferential rate.
3.5. Circular and conduit situations

There are no special rules for circular situations. A US shareholder in a foreign
corporation with a US business will be taxed on dividends and capital gains, and
the foreign corporation will be subject to both direct corporate tax and branch
profits tax on its US source profits. A foreign shareholder in a US corporation
with a foreign business will be subject to withholding tax on dividends (but no
tax on capital gains), and the corporation will be subject to US tax on its foreign
earnings.
3.6. Non-discrimination

The above rules generally do not discriminate against foreign investors, in comparison with the treatment of domestic investors. The one exception is the branch
941
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profits tax, but this is justified as a way of equalizing the treatment of foreign
investors with branches and subsidiaries, and of indirectly taxing the ultimate
foreign shareholders in the same way US shareholders are taxed (i.e. double taxation). Recent US treaties explicitly permit the tax to be levied.

4. International tax planning to relieve company/
shareholder double taxation
4.1. Source-country perspective

A foreign investor in a US corporation can avoid double taxation in a variety of
ways. Most obviously, since capital gains are generally not subject to US sourcebased tax, the foreign investor (direct or portfolio) can avoid double taxation by
refraining from dividend distributions and instead selling the shares. Similarly,
the branch profits tax is most easily avoided by retaining the profits in the US.
Another common technique used by portfolio investors to avoid US taxation
of dividends (at 30 per cent or at least 15 per cent) is to enter into a total return
equity swap with a domestic US investment bank, which in turn purchases the
underlying shares of a US corporation. When the corporation pays a dividend,
there is no withholding tax since the dividend is paid to a domestic shareholder.
The bank reports the dividend as income but takes an offsetting deduction for a
dividend equivalent amount it pays under the equity swap to the foreign investor.
Under source rules, the dividend equivalent amount is not subject to withholding
tax. The IRS is aware of this situation but has done nothing to stop it, perhaps to
encourage inbound portfolio investment.
Another technique to avoid taxation of dividends is to substitute interest payments, which are generally not subject to withholding tax for portfolio investors
even in the absence of a treaty (and may not be subject to withholding tax under
treaties to direct investors). For direct investors, this technique is subject to thin
capitalization limits.
Finally, it is conceivable that in the future more US tax treaties will be negotiated with a Oper cent withholding rate for direct dividends, like the new US-UK
treaty.
4.2. Residence-country perspective

It is difficult to avoid double taxation for US portfolio investors in foreign corporations. Dividends are taxable in full (subject to the foreign tax credit for withholding taxes), and capital gains are also taxable (albeit at a preferential rate for
long-term individual investors). Direct investors, on the other hand, typically pay
no US tax on dividends because of the foreign tax credit, although they are fully
taxable on capital gains.
Tax planning efforts by direct investors have therefore focused on ensuring
that the total effective rate of tax (corporate and withholding) in the foreign
942
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source country does not exceed the foreign tax credit limitation. This can be
achieved without triggering CFC inclusions by the use of hybrid entities that are
treated as corporations for foreign purposes and branches for US purposes. For
example, in one transaction an operating German subsidiary with high-tax active
income formed a Luxembourg entity, which was treated as a corporation for German and Luxembourg purposes but as a branch under check the box. The Luxembourg entity then lent money to the German corporation, which reduced its
effective tax rate by making deductible interest payments to Luxembourg (which
does not tax the interest). For US purposes, the "loan" from a branch was ignored
and therefore the "interest" did not constitute Subpart F income. Attempts by the
Treasury to combat such transactions were postponed under pressure from Congress until 2006.

5. Discussion and suggestions
Historically, there have been three reasons for countries to adopt corporate/shareholder integration:
(a) Under the classical system, there is a bias to conduct business in non-corporate forms, since they are not subject to double taxation (although this is
mitigated if the individual rate exceeds the corporate rate, since in corporate
form the individual tax can be deferred).
(b) Under the classical system, there is a bias to avoid dividend distributions
and instead retain earnings, thus avoiding the double tax.
(c) Under the classical system, there is a bias in favor of capitalizing corporations with debt (producing deductible interest) rather than equity (producing non-deductible dividends).
None of these reasons is completely convincing in the US context, which may be
a reason why the US has maintained the classical system since 1936 (and indeed
strengthened it in 1986 with the repeal of the "general utilities" doctrine, which
enabled corporations to avoid corporate tax on appreciated assets). First, the
alleged bias against the corporate form is mitigated by the excess of the individual rate over the corporate rate (although that excess is much lower now than it
was before 1986, and is scheduled to disappear) and by the absence of strong provisions to prevent retentions in the domestic context. In addition, under current
rules, the classical system applies primarily to large, publicly traded corporations, while small, closely held businesses are able to avoid the double tax even if
they are in corporate form for non-tax purposes. It is doubtful if there is sufficient
substitutability between the two forms of business for the double tax to create
much deadweight loss. The double tax is a price large businesses have to pay for
access to the public equity markets and the liquidity that accompanies such
access. Finally, to the extent that the corporate tax can be shifted to consumers or
to labor, the bias disappears, and even the Treasury's 1991 integration study has
suggested that considerable shifting can take place. (The bias reappears again if
non-corporate businesses can likewise shift the individual tax burden, but it
943
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seems plausible that the shifting potential of large multinationals is larger than
that of small, closely held businesses.)
Second, the bias in favor of retentions is mitigated by the ability of corporations
to redeem shares from shareholders at the favorable capital gains rate, and by the
fact that numerous shareholders are tax exempt or corporate (and thus do not pay
a full tax on dividends). Indeed, even US corporations that used to pay dividends
have now generally moved to structured redemption programs addressed to their
taxable individual shareholders. Other corporations (especially high-tech ones)
retain all their earnings, but it is not clear that this is primarily tax motivated (corporations used to pay dividends under the same rules in the past). Finally, there is
an unresolved debate among economists whether the dividend tax is capitalized
into the price of the shares. If it is, then the retention bias applies only to new
equity, but new equity is unlikely to pay dividends for non-tax reasons. 5
Third, the bias in favor of debt and against equity is a general problem of the
income tax, which should not be addressed only in the corporate tax area. Moreover, to address it completely it is necessary to make dividends deductible, a form
of integration that is never adopted (in part because it will automatically extend
integration to foreign and tax-exempt shareholders). If integration takes the normal forms of imputation or dividend exemption, there is still a difference in treatment between interest and dividends that can be manipulated.
Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, all of these biases need to
be offset by the countervailing biases created by integration in the international
context. Two situations need to be considered: when the source country is integrationist and the residence country classical, and when the source country is
classical and the residence country integrationist.
5.1. US as residence country
If a US resident portfolio investor invests in shares of a company of an integrationist country, the resulting bias depends on the form taken by integration. If the

source country grants integration in the form of dividend exemption, the US
investor would not benefit since the US would tax him on the dividend without
allowing a foreign tax credit for underlying corporate taxes. A domestic source
country investor would therefore be subject only to the corporate tax, while the
US investor would be subject to the corporate tax, any withholding tax on dividends, and the residual US tax.
If the source country grants integration by way of imputation credits, the key
issue is whether such credits are extended to foreign investors (by treaty or otherwise). If (as is typical) the credits are not extended to foreigners, a domestic
investor would only be subject to tax at his or her individual rate, while the US
investor would be subject to tax at the corporate level, any withholding tax on
dividends, and the residual US tax. Whether the combination of these taxes
exceeds the source country tax on domestic investors depends on how high the
The burden would still fall on the shareholders when they sell their shares, but this is mitigated
by deferral until sale and by the capital gains preference.
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source country rates are (it is conceivable, for example, that the combined tax on
the US investor of 60 in the example above would be matched by the single level
source country tax on a domestic investor).
If the imputation credits are extended to US investors, a different bias arises.
In that case, both domestic and US investors in a foreign corporation would be
taxed the same from the source country's perspective, except that the cost of
imputation credits to US investors would be borne by the source country and any
tax on the dividend collected by the US. From a US perspective, however, there
would be a bias in favor of investing in source country corporations and against
investing in US corporations, since only dividends from the former would carry
the imputation credits. Such a bias would not be eliminated by the US taxing the
dividends in full, since the investor would still receive an imputation credit check
from the source country treasury.
5.2. US as source country
If the foreign residence country grants integration by way of dividend exemption,
presumably the exemption would apply to dividends from US as well as from
domestic corporations. 6 In that case, a bias is created in favor of foreign investors
in US companies, since they would be exempt from tax on the dividend (unless a
US withholding tax applies, but such taxes are reduced by treaty or avoided). A
US domestic investor would be taxable on the dividends in full.
If the foreign country grants integration by way of imputation credits, there
will be no credits available for an investor who invests directly in a US company.
In that case, there will be a bias in favor of investing in domestic corporations.
This bias may be partially eliminated if credit is given for US taxes to a domestic
portfolio investor in a domestic company with US source income. But that would
create a bias in favor of foreign investors in such companies over US investors in
a domestic US corporation.

6. Conclusion and recommendation
In general, there seems to be no reason to assume that the biases created by integration from an international perspective are less important than the biases created by the classical system from a domestic perspective. In fact, the former may
be gaining in importance as cross-border investment grows, while there are reasons to doubt the importance of the latter. This may be the reason why many
countries (e.g. Japan, Germany and the UK) have recently been abolishing or
restricting integration. If the whole world reverted to the classical system, the
international biases would be eliminated.7
This is true for many dividend exemption countries but not for others.
The biases may also be eliminated if all countries adopted integration in similar ways. However,
under current imputation systems, domestic investment in local companies is generally favored
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Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future, some countries will continue to grant
integration, while others (including the US) are likely to maintain a classical system. In that situation, it is necessary to make a choice between the international
biases described above, which is similar to the choice between capital import
neutrality (treating all investors in the source country alike) and capital export
neutrality (treating all investment opportunities to a resident investor alike).
Since most of the empirical evidence continues to suggest that the elasticity of
the demand for capital is greater than the elasticity of the supply of capital, most
economists would support a continued preference for capital export neutrality
(neutrality in the allocation of investments) over capital import neutrality (neutrality in the allocation of savings).
If one prefers capital export neutrality, this suggests that integrationist source
countries should not extend integration benefits to foreign investors (since that
would violate CEN while maintaining CIN). This is consistent with current practice. When the integrationist country is the residence country, integration benefits
should be extended to investments in classical source countries. This can be done
by granting integration credits for taxes paid to the source country, either through
a domestic corporation (which is common) or even through a foreign corporation
(less common but possible - it is equivalent to granting the indirect foreign tax
credit to portfolio US investors, which would raise many difficult administrative
issues). A simpler solution, however, is to exempt dividends from both domestic
and foreign corporations. This would still leave a possible bias in the form of a
dividend withholding tax imposed by the source country (plus a branch profits
tax if the investment is through a foreign corporation), but in the case of the US
portfolio investors can usually avoid the dividend withholding tax.
I would thus recommend that integrationist countries adopt a dividend exemption method of integration, and apply it to both domestic and foreign source dividends. 8 As far as the US is concerned, I would recommend abolishing the
dividend withholding tax and the branch profits tax. This would violate CIN but
would retain CEN, since the double tax would continue to apply to foreign
investors from classical countries but only the corporate tax would apply to foreign investors from integration countries with a dividend exemption in place.

cont.

and inbound and outbound investment discouraged (although ordering rules for distributions
may mitigate this bias). This situation may persist even if all countries adopted integration. In
addition, the current trend seems to be toward abandoning integration rather than adopting it.
An alternative solution would be for countries to tax corporate profits and dividends each at
about half the top personal tax rate. The tax on corporate source income would therefore be
equal to the personal tax but collected in two pieces, one piece when the income is earned and
the other when it is distributed. The source country would tax the profits and the residence country the dividends. This would, however, require a higher degree of cooperation than the solution
proposed in the text.

946

AVI-YONAH
Resume
Les Etats-Unis possedent un systeme fiscal classique pour !'imposition des societes et de
leurs associes; c'est-a-dire que le revenu est impose au niveau de la societe tandis que les
associes sont imposes sur les dividendes, sans exemption ni credit pour les imp6ts sur les
societes payes. La double imposition est quelque peu attenuee par un taux d'imp6t preferentiel sur les gains en capital a long terme, qui est egalement applicable a de nombreux rachats
de societes. Ce regime est egalement etendu a l'echelle internationale. Les Etats-Unis
imposent !es societes nationales sur leur revenu et perc,oivent une retenue a la source de
30 pour cent (reductible par convention a 5 pour cent pour les investisseurs directs et a
15 pour cent pour les investisseurs en portefeuille) sur les dividendes payes aux actionnaires
etrangers. Neanmoins, !es gains en capital des investisseurs etrangers (investissement en
portefeuille ou direct) ne sont pas imposes. Les Etats-Unis imposent egalement les societes
etrangeres sur le revenu de leurs succursales aux Etats-Unis et grevent d'un imp6t sur les
benefices des succursales les benefices generes par une succursale nationale. En tant que
pays de la residence, Jes Etats-Unis imposent Jes dividendes payes tant aux investisseurs
directs qu'aux investisseurs en portefeuille dans des societes etrangeres, et ont des regles
tres precises pour empecher la retention de revenus etrangers a taux fiscal privilegie. Les
retenues a la source perc,ues par des pays de la source etrangers sont generalement imputables; toutefois, seuls Jes investisseurs directs dans une societe peuvent imputer les imp6ts
d'une societe sous-jacents. Ce regime etablit generalement la neutralite entre les investisseurs etrangers et nationaux (les uns et les autres sont assujettis a la double imposition, sauf
sur les gains en capital) mais cree des desequilibres lorsqu'un resident des Etats-Unis
investit dans un pays integrationniste ou qu'un investisseur etranger originaire d'un pays
integrationniste investit aux Etats-Unis. Le rapport recommande d'attenuer quelques-uns de
ces desequilibres en demandant au pays integrationniste etranger d'exempter Jes dividendes
en provenance de societes des Etats-Unis, et aux Etats-Unis de supprimer sa retenue a la
source sur Jes dividendes et l'imp6t sur les benefices des succursales. Aucun changement
n'est recommande pour le traitement classique en vigueur d'un investisseur des Etats-Unis
dans un pays integrationniste.
D'une maniere generale, les Etats-Unis ont un systeme d'imposition classique pour Jes
societes et leurs associes, quelque peu attenue par un taux d'imposition preferentiel pour les
gains en capital. Le systeme classique est egalement applicable aux investisseurs etrangers
dans des societes et entreprises des Etats-Unis, et aux investisseurs des Etats-Unis dans des
societes etrangeres.

Zusammenfassung
Die Vereinigten Staaten haben ein klassisches Steuersystem fiir die Besteuerung von Korperschaften und ihren Gesellschaftern, d.h. Einkommen der Korperschaft wird auf der
Ebene der Korperschaft besteuert und Gesellschafter werden in Bezug auf Dividenden
besteuert, ohne Befreiung oder Anrechnung gezahlter Korperschaftssteuern. Die Doppelbesteuerung wird zum Tei! gemildert <lurch einen Vorzugssteuersatz fiir langfristige
Kapitalgewinne, der auch fiir zahlreiche Aktieneinziehungen gilt. Dieses System wird auch
auf internationale Verhaltnisse angewandt. Die USA besteuern ihre inlandischen Korperschaften mit ihrem Einkommen und erheben eine Quellensteuer von 30 Prozent (<lurch
Abkommen auf 5 Prozent fiir Direktanleger und 15 Prozent fiir Portfolio-Anleger reduzierbar) auf Dividenden, die an auslandische Gesellschafter gezahlt werden. Es gibt jedoch
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keine Kapitalgewinnsteuer ftir auslandische Anleger (Portfolio- oder Direktanleger). Die
USA besteuern ferner ausliindische Korperschaften in Bezug auf das Einkommen ihrer
Niederlassungen in den USA und erheben eine Niederlassungsgewinnsteuer auf Gewinne.
die von einer inliindischen Niederlassung abgezogen werden. Als Wohnsitzland besteuern
die USA Dividenden, die sowohl an Direkt- als auch an Portfolio-Anleger in ausliindischen
Korperschaften gezahlt werden, und es gibt ausgefeilte Vorschriften, um eine Nichtausschtittung niedrig besteuerter ausliindischer Ertriige zu verhindem. Im Ausland erhobene
Quellensteuern sind im Allgemeinen anrechenbar, doch konnen nur Korperschaften in
ihrer Eigenschaft als Direktanleger die Anrechnung gezahlter Ki:irperschaftssteuern in
Anspruch nehmen. Das System ist im Allgemeinen in Bezug auf ausliindische und
inliindische Anleger neutral (beide unterliegen der Doppelbesteuerung, ausgenommen auf
Kapitalgewinne), bewirkt aber Verzerrungen, wenn ein Ansiissiger in den USA in einem
Land mit Integrationsbesteuerung investiert oder ein Auslander aus einem Land mit Integrationsbesteuerung in den USA investiert. Der Bericht empfiehlt, einige dieser Verzerrungen dadurch zu beseitigen, dass das Land mit einer lntegrationsbesteuerung Dividenden
einer US-Korperschaft von der Steuer befreit und die USA ihre Quellensteuer auf Dividenden sowie die Niederlassungsgewinnsteuer abschaffen. In Bezug auf die derzeitige klassische Behandlung eines US-Anlegers in einem Land mit Integrationsbesteuerung wird
keine Anderung empfohlen.
Im allgemeinen haben die Vereinigten Staaten ein klassisches Steuersystem fiir Ki:irperschaften und Gesellschafter, das zum Tei! <lurch einen Vorzugssteuersatz ftir Kapitalgewinne gemildert wird. Das klassische System gilt auch ftir ausliindische Anleger in
US-Ki:irperschaften und US-Unternehmen sowie ftir US-Anleger in ausliindischen Korperschaften.

Resumen
EEUU tiene un sistema tributario clasico en lo que se refiere al gravamen de las sociedades
y sus accionistas, es decir, la renta tributa a nivel de la sociedad y los accionistas tributan
por los dividendos, sin exenci6n ni credito fiscal por los impuestos pagados. La doble
imposici6n se ve algo atenuada por un tipo impositivo preferente sobre las plusvalfas a
largo plazo, y que es tambien aplicable a muchas recompras de sociedades. Este regimen
se extiende a escala internacional. EEUU grava la renta de las sociedades nacionales, y
establece una retenci6n en la fuente de! 30 por ciento (reducible por convenio al 5 por
ciento para inversores directos y al 15 por ciento para los de cartera) sobre los dividendos
pagados a los accionistas extranjeros. No tributan las plusvalias de inversores extranjeros
(inversiones de cartera o directos). EEUU grava tambien la renta de las sucursales en el
pafs de sociedades extranjeras y los beneficios generados por una sucursal nacional. Como
pais de residencia, EEUU grava los dividendos pagados a inversores directos y de cartera
de sociedades extranjeras, y cuenta con reglas muy precisas para impedir la retenci6n a
tipos privilegiados de rentas extranjeras. Son genera!mente imputables las retenciones en
la fuente de pafses de! extranjero; no obstante, unicamente los inversores directos de una
sociedad pueden imputar los tributos sociales subyacentes. Este regimen es, en general,
neutral respecto de inversores nacionales y extranjeros (unos y otros sujetos a doble
imposici6n, salvo en plusvalias), pero crea desequilibrios cuando un residente de EEUU
invierte en un pais integracionista o viceversa. La ponencia recomienda atenuar algunos
desequilibrios demandando al pafs integracionista extranjero, exima los dividendos procedentes de sociedades de EEUU y a los EEUU suprima su retenci6n en la fuente sobre los
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dividendos y al impuesto sobre beneficios de sucursales. No se recomienda ninglin cambio
del tratamiento clasico vigente para inversores de EEUU en un pafs integracionista. En
general, EEUU tiene su sistema tributario clasico sobre sociedades y sus accionistas, algo
atenuado por un tipo impositivo preferente sobre las plusvalfas, sistema que es tambien
aplicable a los inversores extranjeros de sociedades y empresas de EEUU y a los inversores nacionales en sociedades extranjeras.
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